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Abstract 
This article is a continuation of the report “Japan’s new competitive 
advantage. Arguments and proposals for structural reorientation” published in 
the „Comparative Economic Research for Central & Eastern Europe”, vol. 13, 
no 1/2/2010, which mainly dealt with the role of the private sector’s cooperation 
with governmental agencies. The discussion presented below is divided into four 
sections. Section one outlines the history of new ITC firms (mobile 
communications, computers) after the year 2000 and addresses innovation 
factors. Section two characterizes Japan’s „dual economy” with respect to 
economic competitiveness and innovation. Section three discusses the major 
structural reforms (Japan Post, the Housing Loan Corporation and the Japan 
Highway Corporation) that were undertaken in Japan in the 21st c. Section four 
of the article provides final conclusions. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the most recent report by UNIDO (the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization)1, in 2009 China preceded Japan in the 
MVA ranking (Manufacturing Value Added), being second only to the USA. 
The statistical data show that China’s MVA converted into the US dollars 
(constant prices of 2000) was 15.6% against Japan’s 15.4% and 19% in the USA 
that continued to be a leader in the ranking. These three global economic powers 
generate together around a half of the world’s industrial output. 
Although China rose to the second position, Japan remained the most 
industrialised country in the world, as the report’s per capita values show 
(almost US$ 9,000 per capita compared with only US$ 700 in China). However, 
as the recent financial crisis has been found to be more damaging to the most 
developed countries, neither the Japanese government nor Japanese 
entrepreneurs should “rest on the laurels”, especially that they have to take up 
challenges that I wrote about in the first article published last year (Młodawska 
2010). 
2. New firms, new products, new branches of industry 
After a stormy period of decelerating growth in the Asian markets in the 
1990s, global investors impatiently awaited new opportunities for raising stock 
prices. Quite unexpectedly, such opportunities appeared in the Silicon Valley 
with the new applications of data communications technologies (Bursa 2008). 
Investors and analysts pinned their hopes on the rising star of information and 
communications technology (ICT), although many small companies entering 
into this business could not prove that they had a solid capital base or relevant 
experience. NASDAQ (National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations), one the major global indexes showing the condition of the 
economy, grew fivefold between 1998 and 2000. In early March 2000 it was at  
a still high level of 5000 points, but over two weeks it nosedived to 1100 points, 
thus initiating a 3 year slump in the global markets (Bursa 2008). 
The automated quotation system JASDAQ that provides brokers and 
dealers with the quotes of securities traded on the OTC market (Over-the-
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 UNIDO’s International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2010,  
http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=7881&tx_ttnews%5D=455&cttash=09cad462f0 (information 
of 18 March 2010). 
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Counter) has a long history in Japan. The securities are usually shares or bonds 
issued by companies that are too small to meet the requirements of the main 
stock exchange. The internet company Yahoo! Japan, a revelation at the onset of 
the 21st. c., was traded on the same market. In 1999, the Mothers Stock Market 
was established in Japan to provide new and promising high-tech firms with 
venture capital. By the end of 2000, four firms entered into this market (Tanaka, 
2000). In the same year 2000, NASDAQ US established NASDAQ Japan 
offering venture capital to businesses. 
Regarding new enterprises that are discussed in this article it has to be 
admitted that the data communications technologies have invariably been 
important for the Japanese economy, even in periods of dragging recession. 
Until 2003, investments in this sector grew faster or declined more slowly than 
in the other branches (from 1994, the only exception was the year 1998). 
Particularly the years 1999-2000 were a period when capital outlays allocated to 
ICT grew very fast compared with other branches, where they clearly declined 
(Nihon Keizai Newspaper, 2000). One of the fastest developing ICT branches in 
Japan is mobile telecommunications. A Nippon Telephone and Telegraph’s 
affiliate NTT DoCoMo which was established in 1991 needed nine years to 
increase its capital to almost 475 billion yens (in 2000), an equivalent of over 
50% of its mother company’s capital (Tanaka, 2000). NTT DoCoMo’ success 
story continued, as after less than a year the company took over NTT’s segment 
of mobile communications. 
Another thriving ICT branch is computers and related products, such as 
Internet communications. Although the sales of personal computers and the 
values of Internet services grew at the end of 1999, total personal consumption 
shrank. New Internet firms were established, for instance Yahoo! Japan. Its 
initial capital standing at 2 million yens in 1997 went up to 60 million yens in 
March 2000, when the period of growth fuelled by speculators ended. Another 
new firm is the Softbank Corporation that initially published computer 
magazines. Today Softbank incorporates several firms presenting different 
business profiles: computer hardware and software for consumers, internet 
services, mobile communications, financial services and others. 
In matching economic growth and its drivers we need to note that even in 
the „lean” years of the 1990s periods of accelerated growth could be observed, 
for instance the years 1995-1996 and 2000, when the Japanese government 
pursued expansionary fiscal policy with increased spending funded from public 
debt. However, the policy’s stimulating effects were short-lived, unlike the 
permanently increased government debt (in 2000 gross public debt amounted to 
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around 142% and to ca. 199% in 2008)2. After several years during which the 
atmosphere of success was being irrationally inflated in the international ICT 
markets, global investors burst the speculative bubble on 11 March 2000, when 
they demanded tangible financial results. 
Private investments in Japan had a negative value in 2002, but a year later 
the expectations of a better economic situation improved and entrepreneurs’ 
investments (with only a limited contribution of the government outlays) became 
the main driver of growth. The year 2005 was very special for the Land of 
Cherry Blossoms: the main factor improving the current account balance became 
returns on investments and not foreign trade receipts (however, the 
disadvantageous economic situation that occurred in the international markets 
then has to be taken into account). The value of Japanese exports and private 
investments decreased following the decline in international trade between 2007 
and 2010. The domestic consumption shrank because of employment and wage 
cuts that could be seen across the economy. The governmental agencies’ 
estimates show that the fiscal impulse in 2009 is likely to accelerate production 
growth and make it reach positive values, although its level will not exceed 1% 
of GDP throughout 20103. 
The „engines” driving the internal growth of the Japanese economy can be 
divided into three categories: 
1. small subcontracting firms, characterised by traditional profiles and ways 
of doing business, usually weak and dismissing their workers when 
recession comes; 
2. start-up enterprises with the potential for dynamic growth; this group 
incorporates the ICT firms; 
3. big business, i.e. well-established huge „keiretsu” that in practice very 
slowly depart from the life-time employment principle. 
The powerful Japanese „keiretsu” face the challenge of replacing 
operations strategy (mainly price-based competition and standardized products) 
with one emphasising long-term stabilization and high profitability (mostly 
competition based on new products). The unquestionable „icons” of Japanese 
economy, Honda, Sony and Toyota, are setting a good example in this area. 
There are also cases of new thriving firms that were established in the 1990s, 
such as Nidec (a Kyoto-based computer company), Rohm (semi-conductors, 
Kyoto), Kyoden (consumer and industrial electronics, Nagano), Shimano 
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 EconStats, Wall Streets, NY, http://www.econstats.com/weo/V031.htm  
3
 Key Points of the Japanese Economy. Internal documents of the Economic Section of the 
Japan Embassy in Poland, 5 July 2009. 
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(bicycles, Osaka). All these organizations specialize in very precisely defined, 
narrow ranges of diversified products. Representing a modern model of the 
Japanese company, they do their business without imitating any other 
organization (Porter, Takeuchi, Sakakibara 2000). 
Most large corporations still use a cross-shareholding system, where 
around 60% of the shares belong to strategic investors, mostly banks, insurance 
companies and other firms that are interconnected by long-term business 
relations. This ownership structure causes that the managers mainly think in 
terms of their organizations’ sizes and sales volumes and not their current 
profitability, thus keeping busy other organizations being part of the same 
system. 
Japan has one of the lowest numbers of new firms among the developed 
countries. Therefore, adaptation of activities and changes in their effects is even 
more important in the case of the restructuring giants than in the new 
organizations. The innovation-stimulating factors include (Vogel 2006, pp. 157-
204): 
1. firm’s general financial result (its condition); 
2. the involvement and strength of foreign investors (as well as managers); 
3. the sector of activity; 
4. firm’s age. 
The impacts of the factors were investigated by Vogel, who analysed the 
stories of four electronic firms (NEC, Softbank, Sony, Hikari Tsushin) and two 
car manufacturers (Toyota, Nissan) over the last 20-30 years. 
An empirical verification of the first factor shows beyond any doubt that 
the large, well-established organizations experiencing financial problems are 
more determined to implement innovative changes than their more effective 
competitors. Nissan’s story compared with Toyota’s confirms this opinion, 
likewise NEC contrasted with Sony and Hikari Tsushin with Softbank. In each 
of the cases, the temporarily underperforming firms were necessarily becoming 
more dynamic. The second factor – the foreign component – exerted bi-
directional impacts: foreign majority owners insisted on shaping the supervisory 
system after the Anglo-Saxon model (with profits being the criterion of 
performance) and foreign managers, having weaker bonds with the Japanese 
culture and being less obligated by the special relations between business 
partners, implemented innovations more easily than their Japanese counterparts. 
This hypothesis held true again when the cases of Nissan managed by a French 
director and Toyota controlled by traditional Japanese management were 
compared. Although a comparison of the international Sony Corporation with 
NEC does not show that Sony was more innovative in the period in question, 
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this conclusion can be drawn from the relatively more advantageous financial 
situation of first organization. 
A comparison of the sector-specific innovation, e.g. cars against 
electronic products, corroborates the hypothesis about a modular production 
system (electronic products) being more conducive to innovation than an 
integrated approach, which is typical of the automotive industry. Accordingly, 
NEC and Sony implemented more new projects than Toyota did, perhaps even 
more than Nissan. The last of the three factors is age of the sampled firms. The 
well-established firms having rich traditions and long history are considerably 
more conservative and adhere to the rules of corporate culture. The new firms, 
for instance those in the ICT sector, frequently have to break the rules to become 
visible in the very competitive market (Softbank, Hikari Tsushin). Not only do 
they refuse to observe the life-time employment principle and to promote and 
pay their employees according to their seniority, but they also frequently clash 
with the authorities, when the latter try make them comply with their decisions. 
The section below tells the story of a relatively new ICT organization, 
which was established in 1981. Founded by Masayoshi Son, a son of Korean 
immigrants, Softbank initially sold computer software. Having entered the stock 
exchange in 1994, the firm started aggressively and successfully invest in the 
venture capital market, targeting mainly the US Internet start-ups and achieving 
spectacular successes in this field (Yahoo). The SBI Group providing financial 
services was established five years later. In 2000 Softbank acquired almost  
a 50% stake in the declining state-owned Nippon Credit Bank, now Aozora 
Bank (Vogel 2006, pp. 157-204). As a cure for the bank’s problems, Son 
suggested linking electronic banking with investments in the data 
communications technologies. When the plan turned out to be a failure, he 
decided to sell most of his shares. Although the Japanese government (Financial 
Services Agency) pressed him to sell his holdings in the financial institutions to 
the domestic investors, Son preferred to transfer them to the US investment fund 
Cerberus. 
During the dot-com boom (data for February 2000), the market ranked 
Softbank third in value terms, even before Toyota and Sony, right after NTT 
DoCoMo and NTT (Lynskey, Yonekura 2001, pp. 1-15). Because the dot-com 
bubble burst, Softbank decided to sell its holdings in many projects to repay its 
debts and to finance new investments (Son did not want to take out more loans 
and his company was priced too low on the stock exchange to issue bonds). 
Son’s genius prompted him to start selling broadband Internet access. He 
took advantage of the government’s decision that made NTT put out on lease its 
idle teletransmission lines and reduce charges for the inter-operator connections. 
Softbank’s determination to beat NTT as a provider of broadband Internet 
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services entailed extremely capital-intensive investments in infrastructure 
(approx. 37,000 yens to connect one subscriber4) and modems that were 
accessible free of charge at railway stations. This activity made the Japanese 
market for Internet services more open; at the same time, Softbank with its more 
than 2 million subscribers outdistanced NTT as a provider of broadband Internet 
services. However, the heavy investment outlays that the company made and the 
lower-priced assets in its portfolio caused that its financial results were negative 
in both 2003 and 2004. Another painful blow came when NASDAQ Japan 
closed in August 2000. Despite all these failures, Softbank decided to acquire 
Japan Telecom, a telecommunications company on the verge of bankruptcy. 
Doing so, foresightful M. Son could save money on the jointly conducted 
operations and on marketing its services to Japan Telecom’s subscribers. 
A turning point in the organization’s expansion was the year 2005 when 
Softbank, getting ready to enter into the segment of mobile communications, 
limited its activity as the provider of broadband services to the most profitable 
undertakings. A year later Softbank purchased Vodafone Japan (the largest 
M&A project in Japan so far). The acquired firm was renamed Softbank 
Mobile5. In 2008 Softbank Mobile went into partnership with Apple to sell its 
new mobile phone iPhone. Owing to the product’s immense popularity, the 
company’s current profits in this segment rose by as much as 80% and now 
Softbank is the only official vendor of iPhones in Japan. The company continued 
its internationalization – in 2010 Son invested US$ 20 million to purchase  
a 13.7% stake in Ustream Inc., a US provider of broadband streaming services, 
hoping to increase the stake to over 30% in 20116. Based in California, Ustream 
operates an interactive platform for live transmissions that viewers receive via 
the Internet and mobile phones. 
Today Softbank is the smallest of the three largest providers of mobile 
communications services in Japan (after NTT DoCoMo and KDDI). The second 
important source of its incomes is Internet portals (Yahoo Japan, betting and 
community portals, trade in listed securities). M. Son has built its prominent 
position in the Internet and media market not only on his compliance with the 
rules underpinning Japanese corporate culture (the „zaibatsu” structure, cross-
shareholding system), but also on the deliberate opposition to these values (he 
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 Softbank profit soars;  buys stake in Ustream, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/technology/view/softbank-profit-soars-buys-stake-in-
ustream z 3 lutego 2010 
5
 Whatever Became of Hikari Tsushin? Ebiz news from Japan, „J@pan Inc”, 3 March 2008 
http://www.japaninc.com/tt459  
6
 Ibidem. 
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rejects the life time-employment principle, the employees are assessed based on 
their merits and not seniority, government’s instructions are challenged). The 
Softbank case provides grounds for making an informed guess that its successes 
should be attributed not to the company’s applying, or not, to the traditional 
Japanese methods, but to its using methods that were effective under the given 
circumstances.  
A large number of “long-lived” enterprises in Japan compared with other 
countries – around 3,000 organizations have been active for longer than 200 
years and 100,000 were established over 100 years ago (Susumu, 2009, pp. 4-5) 
– demonstrates that Japanese firms are very adaptable to changing market 
conditions. Among the 100,000 firms, around 45,000 conduct some type of 
manufacturing activity. Some firms stick to traditional products, such as fabrics, 
sweets or medicines, but many of them have added modern products to their 
business profiles. For instance, the ironworks NTK (the Nagase Tomejuro Kojo 
Corporation)7 which was established in 1871 to produce cast iron shovels, 
horseshoes, pots and pans, now delivers ultraprecise metal components 
necessary to produce semiconductors. The company owner says that the long-
term success needs skills and techniques that no textbook or a business plan can 
teach. The Nissha Printing company established in Kyoto in 1929 has a long 
history as a producer of high-quality prints. Its first printing base was paper, 
which was replaced in the 1960s by plastic and film elements of electronic 
devices. In the 1990s the company extended the range of its products to the 
active elements of touch screens. 
As the period of almost 30 years shows, only the largest of the micro ICT 
organizations have survived – those having solid financial base and company 
tradition, e.g. Softbank, Rakuten and Livedoor. Unfortunately, no firm as large 
as Microsoft has emerged. 
Economists believe that many Japanese enterprises legitimately 
implemented profound restructuring processes. Moreover, the country’s 
domestic consumption has been stimulated in the last decade owing to the 
introduction of exclusive and expensive products (e.g. digital cameras, plasma 
and LCD television sets, hybrid cars). Japanese firms return to the country to 
produce many high-tech products, which is a positive phenomenon in itself.  
A case in point is the producer of integrated circuits Toshiba that between 2006 
and 2007 made a record-high investment of 354 billion yens in new assembly 
lines in its flagship company based in Yokkaichi (Kojima 2008, p. 308).  
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 The examples were found in the following articles: N.Susumu, Roots in the Past, Ready for 
the Future (pp.4-6) and T.Koki, Cell Phones Would Hardly Work without Japan’s Input (pp. 6-9); 
both in: “Nippon.Discovering Japan ...,” op. cit. 
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In 2006 Toray signed a 16-year contract with Boeing for the delivery of carbon 
fibres used for producing the B787 airliners. The contract will expire in the year 
2021 and its worth is estimated to exceed 700 billion yens (Kojima 2008,  
p. 308). 
Therefore, the hopes for a more dynamic growth of the Japanese economy 
should be pinned on the innovative attitudes among the small and large firms, on 
the development of products that are too complicated and modern to be made 
outside Japan, but also on the government’s reformative actions. 
3. „Dual economy” and the call for structural reform 
Year in year out the Japanese government pursued policy that created two 
Japans: one exporting very competitive products and the other made of deficit 
sectors producing for the domestic market. The reasons for the low efficiency of 
many branches should be sought in the huge number of regulations that inflate 
their costs and in competition restricted by the unutilised potential of economies 
of scale. A pertinent illustration is protection given to small shops against the 
competition from large supermarkets that are bound by many rules, one of them 
being the requirement to complete over 200 forms when the organization applies 
for a permit allowing it to deal in meat, tofu or consumer electronics products, or 
deliver laundry services. The building industry in Japan, notorious for unfair 
tender procedures involving public-sector contracts, corruptive contacts between 
businessmen, politicians and bureaucrats from the ministry of building, and for 
blocking foreign competition, is equally dispersed. 
The argument for keeping the status quo arises from the assumption that 
„the competitive Japan” will earn for the entire economy, while the „non-
competitive one” will provide economic stability, jobs, self-sufficiency, as well 
as an informal pension system for the domestic business. As a result, the 
Japanese building industry employs around 10% of the country’s total 
workforce, being particularly important in the regions where other jobs are 
lacking. This situation frequently leads to overdeveloped local infrastructure. 
For instance, small towns have concert halls that are usually empty or rivers  
a provided with concrete beds (Japan is a world leader as a concrete 
manufacturer). The creators of this dual “system” did not predict it negative 
impacts, though; the underperforming branches of the domestic industry increase 
the costs of exports’ components, as well as contributing to high costs of living, 
i.e. high levels of domestic prices. The indirect impacts are that new and crucial 
exporting branches are almost completely absent. 
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Japan is well known for its uncompetitive workforce showing limited 
productivity in almost all types of services, for instance telecommunications, air 
transport, private banking, catering services, wholesale and retail trade. Japanese 
department stores and banks still keep human workforce, while the developed 
western countries usually replace it with automated systems and self-service 
solutions. For the sake of illustration, the Japanese government allowed 
consumers to purchase fuels on a self-service basis as late as 1997. All these 
circumstances make Japan different from the other developed economies where 
services are important drivers of growth and an item of international trade. 
Besides, the Japanese still offer services that cannot be found in other parts of 
the world. 
Porter, Sakakibara and Takeuchi (2000) investigated the relationships 
between the share of goods in the volume of export and traditional theory of 
competition. Among the four factors they distinguished as the determinants of 
national competitive advantage (Porter 2001, pp. 206-227), i.e. the availability 
and quality of labour force, capital, the size of the internal market and the degree 
of rivalry between domestic producers, the last factor was recognised as the 
most important8. The strength of competition was unquestionably the most 
important explanatory variable: the branches where the domestic producers 
fiercely competed were the most successful in the global markets. Quite  
a different situation could be observed in industries covered by the government’s 
protectionist policy that provided trade and manufacturing with a safety net. 
Interestingly, in all branches that could not demonstrate global successes 
market competition was in fact limited by the government. For instance, the 
government officials imposed production quota on the chemical industry and 
determined the degree to which its production capacity could be utilised. 
Regarding transactions involving securities, specific regulations and a system of 
fixed commissions granted a privileged position to four organizations (now 
three, after Yamaichi Securities went bankrupt). Sufficient resources of 
productive inputs ensure comparative rather than competitive advantage, the 
latter being apparently determined by firms’ clear-cut business strategies. 
Those industry branches that were not successful enough to establish their 
presence in the global markets usually had poorer access to the primary 
productive resources (Porter’s first and second factors). The relevant examples 
are production of chocolate when the prices of imported sugar and cocoa are 
high, air transport unsupported by well-developed experimental infrastructure, 
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 M. Porter, M. Sakakibara, H. Takeuchi, op. cit., chapter IV. The survey spanned a period of 
18 years (1973-1990) and covered large firms which data were available. 
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chemical industry suffering from a shortage of specialist engineers and an 
underdeveloped network of university laboratories. 
Regarding the third of the factors determining high competitiveness, 
Japan’s a large and absorptive domestic contributed to mass, standardized and 
weakly diversified production. When consumers have to choose between similar 
products, then price become the conclusive criterion, which certainly does not 
help producers improve their profitability. Imitation, constant improvements to 
obsolete products, manufacture of full ranges of products cannot form a basis 
enabling a country to achieve modern competitive advantage. The only way is 
rivalry, originality and the identification of product niches. Until the 1980s, 
Japanese corporations were among the most competitive organizations in the 
world in many high-tech sectors, but within a decade serious changes took place 
and threats appeared. Their western competitors successfully adapted Japanese 
management practices and even improved them (Charkiewicz 2008, pp. 94-113). 
At the same time, Asian producers came with similar products, but their costs of 
the products they copied were much lower than in Japan. 
Summing up, “Japan’s dual economy” is still live today. Firstly, only very 
few industries have been successful on the international scale (mostly those 
producing consumer electronics and cars); as a matter of fact, that strong 
concentration of export activity is more frequently found among small 
economies and Japan is not one of them. Secondly, since 1960s the Japanese 
firms have usually earned lower rates of return on the invested capital compared 
with firms in other developed countries. Thirdly, although the electronics and 
automotive industries have always been the sources of Japan’s exports and 
competitiveness, there is also a whole, vast sector of the economy where 
efficiency is low. It consists of two types of organizations: one type is involved 
in international trade, but without much success (chemistry, agriculture, 
medicines, computer software, services), and the other meets domestic demand 
(wholesale and retail trade, transport and logistics, building, power industry, 
production of foodstuffs, healthcare). 
The government’s approach to the frequently deficit sectors and branches 
has always been definite and protectionist. Customs barriers and other measures 
were applied to restrict imports under the banner of so-called educational 
protectionism (Bossak 2006, pp. 199-200). Unfortunately, many of the protected 
areas show low efficiency still today. Domestic production has invariably been 
an important resource of jobs, thus replacing to a large extent the 
underdeveloped social security system.  
However, this long-term policy pursued by the government contributed to 
the aforementioned high levels of domestic prices and caused problems with 
making exports competitive in the long term. The last several decades show that 
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in the competitive branches government’s interventions were not significant, but 
in the deficit branches numerous anti-recession price-fixing and production-
limiting cartels as well as other administrative measures restricting competition 
were a rule (Bossak 2006, pp. 111-112). 
4. Government initiatives: strategies for socio-economic development, 
privatization and commercialization 
Besides the above actions that the Japanese firms launch to raise their 
productivity and improve innovation, the government’s strategic activity is also 
essential for providing Japan with a new competitive edge. The Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the Ministry of Economy, Trade 
and Industry (METI) that succeeded it have implemented four long-term 
national development programs in the post-war period: 
1. in the 1960s and 1970s an ‘engines of growth’ strategy (picking the 
winners) was pursued, emphasising the development of the heavy industry, 
the automotive industry, the ship-building industry and the electrical 
machinery industry, etc.; 
2. the 1980s was a decade of technopoles and technology parks that were set 
up to initiate future technological boom in the field of electronics; 
3. in the 1990s networks linking and promoting innovative micro and macro 
organizations were promoted; 
4. since 2001 METI has been implementing the concept of regional clusters. 
Under the most recent strategy the country has been divided into 19 
clusters grouping 5000 small and medium-sized enterprises, 200 universities and 
many cooperating organizations in 9 Japanese regions. The program is carried 
out by horizontally-integrated, collaborating biopharmaceutical firms, ICT firms 
and modern manufacturing enterprises and managed by bureaucrats representing 
METI’s central and regional levels. 
The METI’s present plans are the most ambitions of all concepts that have 
been applied for the last 30 years. They span a long period of 23 years, reaching 
the year 2024. They are almost exclusively founded on M. Porter’s theoretical 
achievements and its well-known rhombus and socio-economic clusters’ model 
that describes the conditions under which local firms can attain competitive 
advantage. However, Porter’s proposal used as the single theoretical 
underpinning does not automatically guarantee that METI will fulfil its 
objectives, i.e. better productivity and innovation in the economy and improved 
indicator of firm turnover.  
                                                        Japan’ New Competitive Advantage…                                    73 
METI concentrates its efforts on building infrastructure and formal 
institutions, instead of forming social capital and region-specific capacities for 
bottom-up entrepreneurial initiatives, which would be a more appropriate target 
for the Program. Rather than giving top-down instructions and controlling, the 
Ministry should support local initiatives and encourage entrepreneurs who, 
demonstrating their commitment and knowledge of the local environment, make 
real progress happen. K. Ibata-Arens wrote (Ibata-Arens 2005, p. 103) that the 
delivery of successive conferences attended by foreign scientists and METI 
bureaucrats and seeking specialists skilfully writing grant applications is less 
important than reaching the existing entrepreneurs and groups that take efforts to 
attain their objectives. Local communities allow creating an informal 
atmosphere of trust and interdependence that facilitates innovation in the long 
term. Entrepreneurial individuals can mobilise latent internal and external 
resources around which coalitions able to implement effectively the concepts of 
socio-economic development can be built. 
If the METI officials can find local coordinators and exploiters of 
resources with proven track record of professional success, then the whole 
project is likely to succeed. Then, after several years, METI will be able to run 
its programme as a real partner to local entrepreneurs seeking to improve the 
competitive advantage. It will become an institution providing consultants to 
support the implementation of particular local programmes, as well as business 
angels funding innovative projects in the regions. 
It is also important for the METI officials to be able to recognize and 
award local entrepreneurs’ contributions to regional projects instead of taking 
the projects over and tagging them as national undertakings developed at the 
Ministry. A good example to follow is the Silicon Valley where the entire cluster 
developed from a systematically organized process initiated by local universities 
and then joined by local firms, without any involvement from the government 
administration, at least at its early stages.  
Another initiative of the Japanese government that is aimed to boost 
innovation and productivity of the Japanese economy is based on privatization 
and restructuring. Let me present now the most important projects in this area: 
the privatization of Japan Post (JP), the case of the highway companies (the 
Japan Public Highway Corporation) and the changes in the operation of the 
Japan Housing Loan Corporation, a governmental institution providing 
borrowers with funds for their own houses. 
Successive governments, particularly that headed by the great reformer 
Prime Minister J. Koizumi (2001-2005), attempted to limit the involvement of 
the state by reducing amounts allocated to public works and deregulating 
economic processes, but also by privatizing a range of the state-owned 
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enterprises. In 2005, Koizumi put forward a plan to privatize Japan Post being in 
fact the largest world bank in asset terms. The saving system based on the 
network of post offices is immensely popular in Japan, particularly in small 
town. The plan failed and as an act of political retaliation Kozumi removed from 
the then ruling Liberal Democratic Party of Japan several tens of deputies who 
contributed to this failure (Vogel 2006, pp. 157-204).  
Considering the essential role that postal services play all over the world, 
they are generally provided by the government-owned corporations. However, 
the public sector is usually less effective than the private sector. Because of that, 
many countries decided to privatize their postal services. J. Koizumi was one of 
the few Japanese politicians for whom the privatization of Japan Post was  
a duty, almost a passion. However, the organization could not be privatized 
without taking account of some specifically Japanese factors (Takenaka 2008, 
pp. 128-129): 
1. JP’s financial assets representing citizens’ savings (bank deposits) and the 
amounts related to life insurance policies (insurance funds) were estimated 
to exceed 300 billion yens (approx. 3 billion US dollars), an equivalent of 
the assets held by three large private banks. 
2. Citizens’ private resources were used to fund local investments through the 
governmental Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP), which was in 
fact a second state budget that frequently came in handy when political 
goals had to be attained. The postmasters were invariably important 
elements of the election apparatus of successive ruling parties. 
3. The postal trade unions, recognized as one of the strongest organizations of 
this type, exert an extremely strong influence on the ruling parties’ 
politicians, because of which resistance against privatization was and still is 
substantial. 
Koizumi’s reformation plans were almost exclusively based on the 
cooperation with a professor at the Keio University, Heizo Takenaka. Koizumi 
made him a minister for economy and fiscal policy and a minister for financial 
services in charge of solving the banks’ bad-debt problem, and finally a minister 
for postal service privatization. Takenaka’s political career was quite unique in 
Japan, because he left his university directly to become a prominent government 
official, without even being a Member of Parliament. He performed his duties 
throughout the Prime Minister Kozumi’s term, that is for 5 years and 5 months. 
In devising the reform, H. Takenaka defined three key principles that were to 
determine the privatization of Japan Post (Takenaka 2008, pp. 140-142). 
The first principle stated that because of the three main types of services 
delivered by Japan Post, i.e. parcels and letters, banking services and life 
insurance, the giant should be divided into three independent companies. Until 
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that time, all business of Japan Post, including its banking and insurance 
segments, was financially assisted by the state (government guarantees and other 
financial privileges) and the additional incomes were used to subsidize the first 
segment. In other words, not only did the obviously market segments (banking 
and insurance services) receive support, but also the system of internal subsidies 
discouraged any bottom-up initiatives that could make traditional postal services 
more efficient. Although both these aspects were economically wrong, the 
expectation was that the organizations related to Japan Post would insist on 
keeping its status quo and mode of operation. 
The second principle assumed that the new enterprises that would emerge 
after the breakup would have to compete in the market, like all other business 
organizations. This actually meant that the government would withdraw its 
guarantees for the banking and insurance business. Even more serious 
consequences were expected to arise with the creation of a new supervisory 
body; a plan was devised to transfer the two segments under the jurisdiction of 
the Financial Service Agency (i.e. the Ministry of Finance) instead of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (formerly the Ministry of Posts 
and Telecommunications). This decision stirred protests among the „postal 
family members” and sparked a fight between the Ministries for territory 
(power). Moreover, privatization implied that the officers would inevitably lose 
their privileged status of civil servants. 
The third principle proposed appointing a special minister in charge of 
privatization of Japan Post, who would be directly subordinated to the Prime 
Minister and not to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications. This 
solution was intended to ensure that new laws were created autonomously and 
that a new institution monitoring the three new enterprises was established. 
H. Takenaka’s major adversaries, the Minister of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Taro Aso (the future Prime Minister) and the president of 
Japan Post, Ikuta, agreed after many debates to divide the organization into four 
independent companies and to establish Japan Post Holdings Co., Ltd. keeping 
majority stakes in the three companies: (1) parcels and letters, (2) banking 
services, (3) life insurance. A 10-year transitional period was set for the 
companies to achieve full integration with the market system (Economist, 2010). 
The privatization law passed on 14 October 2007 legalized cross-shareholding in 
order to give some protection to the companies providing banking and life 
insurance services against the risk of hostile takeover. At the same time, the 
government committed itself to gradually selling all its shares in the two 
companies. Because of the public character of the postal service company, 
slightly different laws were implemented. The government retained its stake (1/3 
stake in the company holding the controlling interest in 2017, i.e. the last year 
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of privatization). Because the central subsidies grew smaller following the 
reduced number of post offices, local governments demanded that the central 
government increased the shares of tax revenues transferred to the lower tiers 
when annual budgets were being drawn up. 
To reform Japan Postal effectively, more appointments were needed – on 
31 October 2007 H. Takenaka was made both a minister for internal affairs and 
communications and a minister in charge of JP privatisation; at the same time, 
he ceased to be a minister for the economy and fiscal policy. The reform was 
slowly losing its momentum. On 30 March 2010, the government headed by 
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama allowed the postal company to raise the upper 
limit on the deposits from 10 to 20 million yens, i.e. to double it (Economist, 
2010), and the life insurance company was permitted to increase the maximum 
liability amount under a policy from 13 to 25 million yen. The decisions 
(implying governmental guarantees) met with protests from private banks 
complaining that the new solutions breached the market competition rules. On 
24 March 2010, the government passed a budget of 92 trillion yens for the 
financial year starting in April; half of that amount is planned to be raised from 
the government bond issues. 
As well as being involved in the privatization of Japan Post, Prime 
Minister Koizumi also showed special commitment to reforming the special 
public companies that the government supported financially through the FILP, 
granting them 6 trillion yens in subsidies and 24 billion yens in preferential 
loans annually. The money came from the population’s postal savings. FILP 
promoted investments in the so-called emerging industry branches and 
subsidised the development of economically weaker regions from its 
establishment in 1952. Koizumi tried to prove that the system was obsolete, 
burdened the state budget and deformed financial markets. His reform was 
targeted at 77 special public companies and 3,000 affiliated firms. 
He became particularly interested in 4 highway construction companies 
and the Housing Loan Corporation (HLC) that in the post-war period provided 
cheap loans to help people build their own houses. Koizumi initially planned to 
disband the HCL, but then agreed to its privatization. Ultimately, the corporation 
was transformed into the Japan Housing Finance Agency (JHFA) whose 
president was appointed for the first time from among the private sector 
managers (in April 2007)9. JHFA withdrew from the primary loan market to 
deal in a product called „Flat 35” in the secondary loan market. Within the new 
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 Message from the President : Japan Housing Finance Agency,  
http://www.jhf.go.jp/english/message.html  
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business, JHFA provides private banks with most funds that are needed to 
finance the „Flat 35” loans. The banks pay a fixed interest rate, but grant loans 
to the interested clients according to the market rules (Yamori Kondo, 2008,  
p. 63). The system has a built-in securitisation mechanism, under which JHFA 
arranges guarantees for mortgage loans related to „Flat 35”. This is actually  
a program of governmental guarantees for commercial banks that lend money to 
clients wishing to have their own houses. The system makes the Agency 
relatively independent of the government, as its revenues come from the fees 
paid for setting up a mortgage guarantee fund (Mortgage-Backed Securities) and 
not from loans or government subsidies. 
Moreover, Koizumi initially insisted on privatizing all 9 public financial 
institutions (including the famous Japan Development Bank), but the special role 
the institutions play in the system made him accept smaller modifications. This 
special role consists in that they usually grant loans during economic 
deceleration, when the private banks either limit or give up lending at all.  
A particularly fierce battle against the central administration Koizumi had 
to fight to reform the highway companies. In 2002 Koizumi took out 300 billion 
yens earmarked for the construction of highways from the budget, threatened 
that he would freeze completely all amounts allocated for this purpose and 
selected four highway companies for privatization. As initially planned, the 
largest of the four, Japan Highway Corporation, was to be divided into  
3 regional enterprises to prevent the profitable highways from subsidizing those 
operating at a deficit (cross-subsidizing)10. The parliamentary statute passed in 
2004 provided that the government would keep 1/3 of the new companies’ 
shares and would have a right to make decisions in the key areas of the 
companies (approval of business plans, issues of shares, selection of the top 
managers). As the owner of the controlling interest, the government still 
commands the highways and the privatized companies only operate them under 
lease contracts. The government hold out its promise to repay the Japan 
Highway Corporation’s debts, but refused to scale down the plans for highway 
network expansion. Privatization helped stabilize the financial condition of the 
Japanese highway construction sector. 
A separate initiative put forward by the Prime Minister Koizumi’s 
government aimed to establish special economic zones exempted from certain 
government regulations and serving as a means of fulfilling the selected socio-
economic goals. The Program started in 2002 and two years later there were as 
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 F. Mizutani, Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Policy Assessment, 
Paper for the 46th Congress for the European Regional Science Association,  
http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa06/papers/226.pdf  
78                                                                    Jolanta Młodawska                                                        
many as 328 zones divided into ten categories, mostly in agriculture, education 
and local community activities. Because of opinion differences between 
economists and politicians the project was discontinued (Vogel 2006, p. 111). 
5. Conclusions 
It is out of the question that at the present stage of its development Japan 
needs resolute initiatives to improve labour productivity, boost innovation and 
increase the number of new firms (firm turnover). It has to be noted, though, that 
the opportunities that the macroeconomic, fiscal and financial policies may offer 
do not give much room for manoeuvre any longer. Japan’s public debt is one of 
the largest among the developed countries and public works have turned out to 
be very costly, ineffective and corruptive. Besides, monetary policy offers 
limited options of stimulating the economy now, because interest rates are 
negative. 
Therefore, positive changes can be produced by coordinated efforts of the 
innovative firms and government’s strategic reforms. This conclusion is 
additionally enhanced by the fact that, as history shows, in the period of 
recession that comes with every economic cycle new small firms employing to 
10 persons are always found to be the most numerous. The government’s policy 
concerning high-tech start-ups that aims to increase their numbers should 
primarily support the formation of the large firms that can survive changes in 
economic cycles and international competition. 
References 
Bossak J. (2006), Systemy gospodarcze a globalna konkurencja, Warsaw, SGH 
Bursa T. (2008), Historia krachów giełdowych, ‘Deal’, no. 1, April 2008, SKN Inwestor, 
Uniwersytet Łódzki 
Charkiewicz M. (2008), Zarządzanie zasobami ludzkimi. Kultura narodowa a uwarunkowania 
społeczne i kulturowe, [in:] M. Aluchna, P. Płoszajski. Zarządzanie Japońskie. Ciągłość i zmiana, 
Warsaw, SGH 
EconStats, Wall Streets, NY, http://www.econstats.com/weo/V031.htm  
Economist The (2010), Return to sender; Japan's failed postal privatisation, London, 3 April 2010 
Ibata-Arens K. (2005), Innovation Entrepreneurship in Japan. Politics, Organization and High 
Technology Firms, Cambridge University Press 
                                                        Japan’ New Competitive Advantage…                                    79 
Kojima A. (2008), A New Development Model for Japan. Selected Essays, 2000-2008, Tokyo 
Key Points of the Japanese Economy. Internal documents of the Economic Section of the Japan 
Embassy in Poland, 5 July 2009 
Lynskey M., Yonekura S. (2001), Softbank: An Internet Keiretsu and its Leveraging of 
Information Asymmetries, European Management Journal, vol. 19, 1 edition 
Message from the President: Japan Housing Finance Agency,  
http://www.jhf.go.jp/english/message.html  
Mizutani F. , Privatization of the Japan Highway Public Corporation: Policy Assessment, Paper 
for the 46th Congress for the European Regional Science Association,  
http://www-sre.wu-wien.ac.at/ersa/ersaconfs/ersa06/papers/226.pdf 
Młodawska J. (2010), Japan's new competitive advantage: the arguments and proposals for 
structural reorientation, ‘Comparative Economic Research for Central and Eastern Europe’, vol. 
13, no. 1-2 
Nihon Keizai Newspaper (2000), 2 April 2000 
Nippon. Discovering Japan. Special Feature: Brand Japan, no. 1, 2009 
Porter M. (2001), Porter o konkurencji, Warsaw 
Porter M., Takeuchi H., Sakakibara, M. (2000), Can Japan Compete?, London 
Softbank profit soars;  buys stake in Ustream, 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/technology/view/softbank-profit-soars-buys-stake-in-
ustream, 3 February 2010 
Susumu N. (2009), Roots in the Past, Ready for the Future, Nippon. Discovering Japan. Special 
Feature: Brand Japan, no. 1, 2009 
Takenaka H. (2008), The Structural Reforms of the Koizumi Cabinet. An Insider’s Account of the 
Economic Revival of Japan, Nikkei Publishing Inc., Tokyo 
Tanaka A. (2000), Japanese Economy Now, proceedings of the conducted at the Faculty of 
International and Political Studies UŁ, Łódź 
UNIDO’s International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics 2010, 
http://www.unido.org/index.php?id=7881&tx_ttnews%5D=455&cttash=09cad462f0, 18 March 
2010 
Whotever Became of Hikari Tsushin? Ebiz news from Japan, J@pan Inc, 3 March 2008, 
http://www.japaninc.com/tt459  
Vogel S. (2006), How Government and Industry are Reforming Japanese Capitalism, London 
Yamori N., Kondo K. (2008), How has Japan Housing Finance Agency’s Flat 35 affected 
regional housing markets?, Government Auditing Review, March 2008, vol. 15, Tokyo 
 
80                                                                    Jolanta Młodawska                                                        
Streszczenie 
 
NOWA PRZEWAGA KONKURENCYJNA JAPONII:  
INICJATYWY INNOWACYJNE PRZEDSIĘBIORSTW I DZIAŁALNOŚĆ 
REFORMATORSKA RZĄDU 
 
Artykuł ten stanowi kontynuację tekstu opublikowanego w „Comparative 
Economic Research for Central & Eastern Europe”, Tom 13, nr 1/2/2010, p.t. Nowa 
przewaga konkurencyjna Japonii. Argumenty i propozycje na rzecz przeorientowania 
struktur. Została w nim wyeksponowana rola sektora prywatnego we współpracy  
z agendami rządu. Artykuł składa się z czterech części. W części pierwszej 
przedstawiono historię nowych firm w branży teleinformatycznej (telefonia komórkowa, 
komputery) po 2000 roku, a także wskazano na determinanty innowacyjności. W części 
drugiej scharakteryzowano „podwójną ekonomię” Japonii w kontekście 
konkurencyjności i innowacyjności gospodarki. W części trzeciej omówiono 
najważniejsze reformy strukturalne w Japonii w XXI wieku: Poczty, Housing Loan 
Corporation oraz Japan Highway Corporation. W części czwartej artykułu 
zaprezentowano wnioski końcowe. 
 
